Yemen is a country whose name has become synonymous with violence, throughout its history right up to the present day Yemen has known only intermittent peace rather than intermittent conflict, this paper shall seek to examine the conflicts which have taken place in Yemen with a view to devising a plan for the management of current conflicts. With the aim of bringing about a final resolution to the ongoing political violence in Yemen and establishing a degree of security and stability allowing it to become a normalized nation. In so doing this paper shall examine the three broad causal areas which we can directly attribute to the conflict in Yemen. Broadly speaking these consist of; ideological conflict, weak political institutions and economic concerns. Specifically ideological conflict refers to the new distinctly Salafist dynamic which has marked the conflict in Yemen since the turn of the century. Weak political institutions refers to the inability of the Yemeni government to exercise its authority over the whole territory of Yemen and maintain security and stability and economic concerns refers to the tensions which have arisen surrounding Yemen’s vast oil reserves and there distribution. This Paper shall then examine in brief, several events which it is felt typifies each of these broader contexts before going onto examine the significant barriers to conflict management that currently exist in Yemen and why previous efforts have failed.
The portion of conflict that this paper shall examine Begins in 1994 with the civil war or the first civil war to be precise, which took place four years after the unification of the country, amidst growing tensions between the north and south. Many in southern Yemen felt that this was a move motivated by a desire to access their oil fields rather than any political ambitions based upon the mutual benefits of unification. To this day, scholars continue to debate over who started the 1994 civil war, however, the general view is that it was started by the pro-separatist southern forces, and that oil or economic concerns were the key motivator. Interesting to note here is the economic motivation to dissent from the central government. The north defeated the separatists and maintained Yemen’s forcing many key southern Yemenis into exile in the process (Caton 2013, P78). Their victory, however, did not abate the tensions, there was no reconciliation between the factions in the interests of national unity. If anything, it heightened them, culminating in the eventual Yemeni crisis.
There are several key events leading up to this point that we must address to understand the conflict in Yemen fully. First among these is the influx of Jihadi groups into Yemen, why this happened, and the impact it has had. Early in the current Millennium Al Qaeda, waged an armed campaign to try and cement their presence in Yemen, to use as a base for their operations (Gelvin 2015, P113). By exploiting the ineffectiveness of the Yemeni government at exercising its authority over the whole territory, due to its precarious political position (Sadiki 2014, P168). Al Qaeda sought a base to directly combat the USA, and from here Al Qaeda carried out many attacks on American military targets. The most notable of which was the bombing of the vessel USS Cole. This marked the change of the dynamic of the Yemeni conflicts from the classic North/South divide to broader Jihadi ideological conflicts.
These events and what was perceived by some in Yemeni society as the passive toleration of Jihadi incursions, lead into the next significant chain of events in this study of conflict in Yemen, The Houthi insurgency. The Houthi’s or Ansar Allah as they are properly known are a group of renowned Shia fighters who originate from the north of Yemen. They are known for being particularly hard-line in their stance towards both America and Israel. The Houthis and the sect which they represented comprised of about forty percent of the Muslims in Yemen (P.Ram 2015, P477). In early June 2004 the Houthis began an armed campaign against both the Yemeni government, whom they accused of targeting their community, and against Jihadi forces in the region such as Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Sharia, a confederation of several Salafist groups. The Yemeni government in turn stated that the Houthis were merely trying to overthrow the government in order to reverse the ascendancy of the Sunnis in Yemen and enforce their own religious practices. They also accused the Iranian government of providing financial and military support to the Houthis (Casey-Maslen 2014, P234). As seen above the three broad causal factors which can be deemed the roots of much of the political violence and conflict in Yemen are to large extent intrinsically linked
A multitude of different conflict management strategies have been employed in Yemen at various times throughout the conflict. For example, the history of negotiation and mediation in Yemen largely begins in 1974, during the cold war. A series of negotiations to try and resolve the intermittent proxy conflicts in Yemen at this point were unsuccessful. In terms of recent conflict in Yemen these strategies have enjoyed a limited degree of success in terms of managing the conflict for a time. The principle strategy that has laterally been employed in Yemen is what Joseph Nye described classically as the carrot and stick approach (Casanova and Kassum 2014, P2). The main warring factions in Yemen have been offered the benefit of a Western-led intervention to accelerate the rebuilding of their basic infrastructure and 1.6 billion US dollars of aid. This comes however with the threat of military action against all who attempt to disrupt this process, and the very real possibility of the United States sending a substantive military force to Yemen. There is strong evidence to suggest that the USA will step up its military presence in Yemen If one of the other supporting powers such as Russia do the same (AFP 2015). This is possibly why politicians in Yemen have been apathetic to such proposals (Editorial 2010) This is largely why all efforts of continued management and poses serious barriers to both the immediate management of the conflict as well as particular implications for the long term peace building process and political reconciliation in Yemen, as this will remain impossible while transnational Islamist groups are present in the country, and the foremost priority should be to remove them from Yemen.
In terms of managing the ongoing conflicts in Yemen, the first point to address is why is it being managed at all? Is it to preserve the economic interests of some outside actor or is it because of a genuine opinion that Yemen’s problems pose a genuine global security threat and are causing immense humanitarian suffering and therefore must be looked at seriously, therefore the entire outlook of the process must change from superficially stopping conflict intermittently to working on a long term basis to a point where a resolution maybe possible. The first key objective is to establish a lasting peace settlement among the various belligerent factions. However in order for this to be remotely possible a multifaceted solution must be devised which addresses the political, economic as well as distinctly social dynamics of the conflict, social in this case referring to sectarian conflicts Therefore given that the previous attempts at mediation the by Arab coalition and Saudi Arabia have failed and in many ways only exasperated the conflict. The coalition must take a step back from both the conflict and its mediatory efforts.
The multilateralist approach of the Arab coalition largely failed due to divergent interests at a national level translating into a joint effort which was inconsistent with what is required to bring about a degree of immediate stability to Yemen. A unilateral approach is needed in Yemen a country with the political will and resources to send a strong signal of resolve to Yemen in the form of military forces to keep the peace as a sign of its ongoing commitment to what will be a longer process. While Saudi Arabia may seem the obvious choice due to geography, its efforts to intervene previously have been met with a backlash due to a perception that it is only intervening in the first sense to protect its economic interests due to the border it shares with Yemen, and secondly many perceive that Saudis intervention in Yemen is due to a sectarian opposition to the Houthis. Therefore a state is needed which is willing to intervene and meets all the afore mentioned criteria, has a vested interest in security of the region but no direct economic interests to incite a backlash of cynicism and who has former ties to the country. This would leave only Great Britain and turkey, both of whom have former colonial ties to Yemen. Additionally due to the perceptions of Neo-colonialism which have been attached to British interventionist efforts it is preferable that turkey intervenes as it has the security interest, is a fellow Arab country therefore the intervention assumes the guise of an apolitical move in the interests of common security rather than the imposition of western hegemony, and crucially Turkey is at least on paper a liberal state, a society towards which Yemen could aspire and while far from perfect within the political spectrum of Islamic polities Turkey is certainly the most preferable particularly from an economic standpoint.
Additionally, it is crucial to note that the theorization of rising states often looks at a political catalyst which allows a political actor to announce its new found position in the international system, looking at history this would be Japans defeat of Russia or Americas defeat of Spain both in wars during the 20th century, newly risen powers stepping out on the back of declining ones. While the modern international system does not strictly fit such analysis, what can be said is that every state needs some kind of event to underpin a particular period in its history particularly if that state or its antecedents have a long history. For turkey, though its history has been political fractious in many ways. We can say that up until 1924 turkeys historical and socio political identity was clear. But that the post Ottoman turkey has been languishing at the bottom of the international hierarchy struggling to find a moment and event with which to underpin this period of its history and mark its return as a key political actor in the region. Which it clearly feels it should be as we can see with the political sub theme dubbed post Ottomanism. Therefore we can see that in many ways Turkey is a perfect fit to the Yemeni problem, its meets the criteria for a unilateral intervention with its domestic success now translating into regional hegemonic power which is shaping its foreign policy outlook, and the political will both among the populous and within the government to assert themselves with some external event. Yemen’s ongoing crisis is that event.
Crucially if such a settlement was established. It would look like aid from another Arab country, not an imposition by a European power. This is crucial in achieving societal consensus towards a commitment to the political process and the cessation of hostilities. However before this can occur, Saudi Arabia as the primary actor in the coalition would need to indicate a willingness to disengage from Yemen to allow the Turkish intervention to take place, and to do so they themselves would need security assurances. Therefore an immediate unilateral ceasefire, but not disarming, must take place with aid in the form of basic supplies offered to all groups who agree in order to alleviate the rapidly escalating humanitarian situation, bearing in mind often those enlisted to Jihadi groups are radicalized because of the depravity they live in. even groups who will later be deemed unlawful combatants should at this point receive basic aid, in order to guarantee the initial ceasefire which is essential in order for Saudi disengagement and the transition of military and security responsibilities as well as initial communication facilitation to occur.
The main focus of the Turkish effort should be two fold, first of all they must engage in initial dialogue with each of the recognized factions currently engaged in conflict, the recognized legitimacy of factions is important because not all factions currently active in Yemen are legitimate and these groups can play no part in mediatory efforts, and make them a second offer of more substantial humanitarian aid if they will agree to entering into preliminary talks in order to gauge the ripeness of the conflict and have each of the parties rank grievances or outstanding issues which may need to be focused on in order for there to be a chance for a peace settlement to occur as well as addressing. With a view to holding further more substantial talks which will if all parties can be brought on board make a concerted effort towards reaching a lasting and mutually agreeable political settlement. However Turkey must capitalize on its moral position of having no vested interest in intervention in Yemen other than for possible prestige, which Erdogan wants, and send a strong signal of resolve intimating that if the currently warring legitimate factions in Yemen do not subscribe to this process. It will take steps of military intervention regardless It is therefore logical at this point to expect that the three main parties currently conflicting in Yemen and the subsidiary localized factions which support them would agree to such a proposal.
The main barrier to a unified position within the Arab coalition on how best to deal with Yemeni conflicts is reflected largely by the conflict itself, this is sectarian, each Arab nation whether they have a vested interest in Yemen or not has its own preference as to which faction they would see prevail. Based upon increasing the scope of their own denomination of Islam. This is why it is crucial that Turkey make a unilateral intervention in Yemen and do so without the interdiction of any international organisations. Turkey should not prevail upon Saudi Arabia for logistical support but privately welcome any monetary aid or military equipment or intelligence which the Saudis and other Arab nations who support their objectives might offer. As well as taking informal and non-binding advise from UN directives. But the role of international organizations in this respect should be to raise and supply humanitarian aid alleviate civilian casualties.
In terms of peace building and bringing about consensus to build effective political institutions people who are arguably tainted by their involvement in previous conflicts should take a step back from the public aspects of the process as their commitment to the process, while they have a contribution to make and their factions can be part of a democratic process they themselves must not detract from the potential success of the overall process. An example of this notion can be seen in Northern Ireland where people who have been involved previously while they can exert influence however for many people they make it personal because of the nature of their involvement and how this has impacted them. What then happens is a situation where each side tries to establish a moral ascendancy and degree of legitimacy to their previous actions by stating that it was only in retribution of some previous event, raking over the old bones of past conflicts and deeply damaging to the process as a whole. As in the case of both Israeli/Arab and Loyalist/Catholic conflicts and there peace processes.
What is vital in Yemen is to use a framework of shared future building, of two factions cohering into one functioning society and in the mutual benefit and best interest of commitment to the political process and the establishment of security and a degree of normalization. As this will cancel out potential issues arising from issue indivisibility. If consensus can be reached socially in Yemen then social cohesion will be self-assured, much of problems which arise socially are due to understandings and the notion that local identities and there interests conflict with that of the nation state. Yemen’s conflicts regardless of factors can all broadly be attributed to an inability to develop a common sense of identity in the post-colonial era. In order to deal with this problem, Yemen’s tribes must concede that Natural resources are the property of the state and cannot be leveraged or used to threaten internal security. But they should be compensated with infrastructure and guarantees of regional political power within the national framework in exchange for this similar to Pakistan’s Peshawar region.
The second and arguably the most important role in which the Turkish intervention must engage if it is to have any chance of success is eliminating elements within Yemen which cannot take part in the multi-party talks which it hopes to hold. If all of the legitimate parties currently conflicting within Yemen subscribe to the process then the required ceasefire will be in many respects self-assured as long as the Turkish peace keeping contingent sufficiently polices any interactions between the parties and ensures that individual incidents if they occur are dealt with apolitically and in criminal terms so as to not allow an escalation based on individual actions to jeopardize the process as a whole. In addition to this the Turkish intervention must launch a counter insurgent offensive against the jihadi elements who are currently present in Yemen. In this respect The contents of this plan is ambitious however the problem with previous efforts at conflict management is that they have not sent strong signals of resolve and therefore their aims have been to make superficial immediate gains. Turkey must from the outset establish aims commensurate with its efforts.
These non-state actors are both a symptom as well as a cause of the disorder in Yemen. Stirring up societal tensions in order to profit from the disorder and weakening of political institutions by establishing bases for their wider operations in the Middle East. The elimination of such groups specifically the Islamic Jihad of Yemen, ‘Ansar al-Shari’a’ and Al Qaeda Arabian peninsula (AQAP) should be a top priority as their presence and ability to move freely throughout Yemen carrying out operations poses the highest threat to both the immediate security and the long term longevity of any possible progress in Yemen. These groups will see such an intervention as a direct threat to their operations and while not militarily able to directly oppose will look to highlight socio-political divergence among the legitimate parties within Yemen and carry out attacks to put strain on the ceasefire with the ultimate aim of causing it to breakdown. The obvious problem posed here is how practical is it in real terms to completely eradicate a groups which is furnished with equipment and manpower by a global franchise.
While surface analysis would lead to a conclusion of not very, what can be achieved is a near eradication to the point where operations are not deemed feasible as was achieved by the American and Yemeni cooperative in 2006 this again would amount to another display of the strong signal of resolve. Highlight that turkeys political will can with Yemeni support prevail over disruptive Jihadi influences. Initial intelligence sharing from neighboring countries while Yemen develops its own police and security apparatus would be undoubtedly useful at this point, as funding of conflict from diaspora groups continues to be a problem. Therefore the immediate goal in real terms should be to utterly restrict the ability of these groups to freely move throughout Yemen. Restricting them to their bases on the south eastern corner of the country. If this can be successfully achieved in conjunction with the elimination of individuals in other parts of the country. This will allow for a second military phase where operations with the intention of the complete or near elimination of such groups can begin. Decimating there numbers to such an extent that as groups they can no longer operate on any significant scale and allowing the then established Yemeni intelligence services to take over pre-emptively dealing with any future groups and dealing with individuals on the basis of criminality rather than giving credence to their quasi political motives.
Removing the last perceptible vestige of legitimacy from their political stance. In real terms what will be required militarily both in general terms and if these groups can be successfully confined to the south-eastern corner of Yemen, where the geography is not conducive to a sustained insurgency, is an emphasis on drones or Unmanned aerial vehicles which can be complimented with small groups of special operatives and a larger contingent of conventional forces. However multi layered approach is required as we have seen from the current failure of American and Saudi efforts placing an almost total reliance on drones where they are unsuitable and ineffective due to terrain. While what is being proposed throughout the bulk of this plan in itself is ambitious and there would be conflicts between theoretic and the practical implementing of such a plan that would need to be reconciled, Yemen is a troubled corner of the middle east which poses global security threats for various reasons. However if examined closely there is still some hope for Yemen while the situation is grave and decisive action is needed it does not yet displays all of the characteristics of a failed state like Somalia for example. The contents of this plan recognise both Yemen’s potential value and its potential risk to global security. And demonstrates that if a concerted effort is made, while a monumental effort of statecraft is required, it is possible.
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